The Right to Vote and Restrictions on
Crossover Primaries
The success of Dan Walker's bid for the Illinois Democratic gubernatorial nomination in 1972 has generally been attributed to the large
number of Republican voters who refrained from voting in the Republican primary and, instead, voted for Walker in the Democratic
primary.1 These crossovers were made possible by the decision of a three
judge district court declaring unconstitutional an Illinois law that
prohibited a voter from participating in a primary election if he had
voted in a primary of another political party within the preceding
2
twenty-three months.
The decision in the Illinois case is only one of several recent decisions
holding that state laws restricting participation in primaries are violations of the fourteenth amendment's equal protection clause.8
In all these cases, the courts employed a similar rationale. The courts
acknowledged that the states have a legitimate interest in preventing
primary crossover votes cast only for the purpose of disrupting orderly
party functioning and weakening the raided party. But the courts found
that this interest is not sufficiently compelling to outweigh the burdens
placed on the right to vote and associate by statutes restricting crossovers. Each court found support for its decision in the "new equal protection" and the emphasis on the right to vote in recent Supreme Court
decisions.

4

In Rosario v. Rockefeller,5 however, the Supreme Court upheld a
1 Chicago Sun Times, March 22, 1972, at 5, col. 1.
2 Pontikes v. Kusper, 45 F. Supp. 1104 (N.D. Ill. 1972), prob. juris. noted, 41 U.S.L.W.
3524 (U.S. Apr. 2, 1973).
3 In Nagler v. Stiles, 543 F. Supp. 415 (D.N.J. 1972), the court held unconstitutional a
New Jersey statute allowing persons to vote in the primary of one party only if they had
not, in the two preceding annual primaries, voted in the primary of another party. In
Yale v. Curvin, 345 F. Supp. 447 (D.R.I. 1972), a similar statute, requiring a twenty-six
violative of the equal protection clause. And in Gordon v. Executive Committee of
month abstention from voting in primaries before being allowed to cross over was held
the Democratic Party, 335 F. Supp. 166 (D.S.C. 1971), the Democratic Party's local executive committee, acting in contravention of a state statute prohibiting voting in the primary
of more than one political party in the same year, permitted registered voters to participate
in the Democratic mayoral primary even though those voters had voted in a Republican
congressional primary several months earlier. The district court held the executive committee's action required by the Constitution.

4 See text and notes at notes 32-47 infra.
r 93 S. Ct. 1245 (1973).
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New York law that required voters to enroll in the party in whose
primary they wished to participate at least thirty days prior to the
general election preceding the primary. The effect of the statute was to
require the voter to select his party, for purposes of primary voting,
from eight to eleven months before the primary contest. The court
held that this scheme did not disenfranchise any voters but created
only an administrative difficulty, which the voter could avoid by due
diligence. The time limitation for enrollment was found to be a reasonable means to deter raiding. The requirement of an insulating general election and an eight to eleven month time delay hindered the
development of a deliberate and well-executed plan of raiding. Thus,
the legislation, despite its impact on voting and freedom of association,
was sustained because the "time limitation for enrollment [was] ...

tied

to a particularized legitimate purpose, and [was] in no sense invidious or
arbitrary."6 The Court distinguished the New York plan from those
that require the voter to abstain from primary participation for a
specified time before being permitted to switch parties. While not indicating whether it would sustain restrictions of that type, the Court
categorized them critically as those that " 'lock' a voter into an unwanted pre-existing party affiliation from one primary to the next." 7
This comment investigates whether the Supreme Court's voting
rights decisions require holding unconstitutional state statutes that
6 Id. at 1252.
7 Id. at 1250. The costs to the sophisticated voter of crossing over under the New York
law are little more than in an open primary. The only hindrance to participating in the
Democratic primary one year, the Republican the next, and the Liberal the year after, is
the administrative inconvenience of reregistering. But in another way the provisions
upheld in Rosario are more restrictive than the time limitations on crossing over in those
states having "lock in" statutes. Under the New York plan the voter must decide eight
months in advance of the primary whether he intends to cross over, while in the "lock in"
states if the voter has not voted in any primary in the specified time period, he need
not decide in which primary to participate until he is in the voting booth.
Justice Powell, joined by Justices Douglas, Brennan, and Marshall, dissenting, would
have found the New York statute unconstitutional because it imposes "substantial and
unnecessary" restrictions on the right to vote and assodate. Id. at 1253. Justice Powell
acknowledged that there is a state interest in deterring raiding and that administrative
convenience could justify a registration cut-off at some time prior to the primary. He
contended, however, that those interests can be protected by less severe measures, suggesting that an enrollment deadline of thirty to sixty days before the primary--"the period
most vulnerable to raiding activity"--would be sufficient. Id. at 1257. Moreover, the New
York registration requirements apply to those voters not previously affiliated with a
party as well as those seeking to change parties. Justice Powell stated that the danger
of raiding by previously unaffiliated voters is quite insubstantial and, therefore, does not
support the state's argument that deterrence of raiding justifies the statute. Underlying
the dissent is a supposition that the effect of party labels and loyalties on voter decisions
is minimal. Id. at 1256-57. But see text and note at note 91 infra.
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impose "lock in" restrictions on primary crossovers. While the Supreme
Court has indicated that restrictions on the right to vote and political
association will be treated with great suspicion,8 it has also shown reluctance to interfere in the internal operations of political parties.9
The relationship between the restrictions on primary voting and the
operations of political parties is an unexplored problem of crucial importance. If the absence of these restrictions seriously hinders the maintenance of strong and viable political parties, then the issue is more
complex than the courts have recognized and the state interest sought
to be protected is significantly more compelling.
I.
A.

THE

COURTS AND THE NOMINATING

PROCESS

Status of Primary Elections

The early attitude of the Supreme Court toward primary elections is
found in Newberry v. United States:10 that "[primaries] are in no sense
elections for an office, but merely methods by which party adherents
agree upon candidates whom they intend to offer and support for ultimate choice by all qualified electors. General provisions touching
elections in constitutions or statutes are not necessarily applicable to
primaries-the two things are radically different."1' 1 The Court held
that article I, section 4 of the Constitution, which gives Congress power
to regulate elections for the House of Representatives and the Senate,
does not empower Congress to limit expenditures of candidates in
congressional primaries.
Prior to the 1940's, primaries were considered, in the absence of state
regulation, to be functions of the political parties, which were recognized as private associations. Thus, in Grovey v. Townsend,1 2 the Court
held that the decision of the Convention of the Texas Democratic
Party to prohibit all Blacks from participating in the Democratic
primary did not constitute state action and, therefore, was not a violation of the fourteenth or fifteenth amendments. The Court had previously held, however, that any state statute aimed at regulating
primaries was state action and subject to the restrictions of the fourteenth and fifteenth amendments. 13
8 See text and notes at notes 32-47 infra.
9 See text and notes at notes 57-75 infra.
10 256 U.S. 232 (1921).
11 Id. at 250.
12 295 U.S. 45 (1935).
13 In Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536 (1927), a Texas law declaring Blacks ineligible to
vote in the Democratic primary was held to violate the fourteenth amendment. In Nixon
v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73 (1932), regulations promulgated by the Democratic Party executive
committee prohibiting Blacks from voting in the primary were held to violate the
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The judicial view represented by Grovey underwent a radical change
beginning with United States v. Classic.14 In that case, the Supreme
Court held that where victory in a congressional primary was tantamount to election due to the one party nature of the state, the primary
was an integral part of the election process and the right to participate
therein was guaranteed by article I, section 2 of the Constitution.
Hence, a state official who willfully altered and falsely counted and
certified the results of a Louisiana Democratic primary could be convicted for depriving citizens of a constitutionally protected right. 15 Four
years later, in Smith v. Allwright, 6 the Supreme Court explicitly overruled Grovey and declared the "all-white" primary to be a violation of
the fifteenth amendment, even though the restriction had been promulgated by the party convention rather than the state. The Court found
that the primary had become an integral part of the electoral process.
The state's general election ballot designating primary winners as
nominees of the political parties, the restrictions placed on primary
participants in nominating independent candidates, and the state regulation of the mechanics of the primaries, indicated that the primary was
employed by the state as a crucial part of its election machinery. As
such, the primary constituted state action and determination of eligibility to participate was subject to the constitutional restraints of the
7
fourteenth and fifteenth amendments.
In an attempt to circumvent the Court's decision in Allwright, South
Carolina repealed all of its laws regulating the operation of primaries
and permitted the political parties to take over the entire primary
election machinery. In Rice v. Elmore,:8 the Fourth Circuit extended
the Allwright rationale, holding that, despite these actions, the "allwhite" primary violated the fourteenth and fifteenth amendments; the
importance of the Democratic primary within the electoral system was
sufficient in itself to constitute state action.
fourteenth amendment. The regulation was found to be state action when it followed
an explicit legislative delegation of power to the committee to set voter qualifications for
the primary.
14 313 U.S. 299 (1941).
15 The Court overruled a demurrer, which had been sustained by the lower court,
to an indictment alleging a violation of sections 19 and 20 of the Federal Criminal Code,
now 18 U.S.C. §§ 241-42 (1970). Section 19 makes it a criminal offense to "conspire to
injure, oppress, threaten, or intimidate any citizen in the free exercise or enjoyment of
any right or privilege secured to him by the Constitution or laws of the United States
*..
" Section
.
20 prohibits, inter alia, the same offense by one acting "under color of
any law."
16 321 U.S. 649 (1944).
17 Id. at 663-64.
18 165 F.2d 387 (4th Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 333 U.S. 875 (1948).
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In 1953, the Supreme Court itself extended Allwright. It found unconstitutional a local political association's practice of holding an "allwhite" preprimary for the purpose of selecting a candidate to participate in the regular county Democratic Party primary. 19 The winner
of this preprimary had no special status of any kind recognized by the
state, and had to follow procedures for placing his name on the primary
ballot identical to those required of all other potential candidates. In
his plurality opinion, joined only by Justices Douglas and Burton,
Justice Black said:
It is immaterial that the state does not control that part of this
elective process which it leaves to the Jaybirds to manage. The Jaybird primary has become an integral part, indeed the only effective
part, of the elective process that determines who shall rule and
govern in the county. The effect of the whole procedure, Jaybird
primary plus Democratic primary plus general election, is to do
precisely that which the Fifteenth Amendment forbids-strip
Negroes of every vestige of influence in selecting the officials who
county matters that intimately touch the daily
control the local
20
lives of citizens.
The "white primary cases" seem to establish the view that primaries,
as an integral part of the electoral mechanism, constitute state action
and are subject to scrutiny under the fourteenth amendment. The
"white primary cases," however, all involved restrictions based on race,
the most suspect of all classifications. While those restrictions could
not be tolerated, it is possible that where the classification is less clearly
invidious the courts will be more likely to differentiate between the
degree of judicial scrutiny of voting restrictions in primaries and in
general elections. 21
Constitutionality of Franchise Restrictions: The Voting Rights
Revolution
The last two decades have seen a judicial and legislative revolution in
the abolition of franchise restrictions. 22 The courts have adopted a new
B.

19 Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953).

20 Id. at 469-70. For a discussion of the development of the concept of state action and
the impact of Terry on that development, see generally Comment, The Strange Career oJ
"State Action" Under the Fifteenth Amendment, 74 YALE L.J. 1448 (1965).
21 See Casper, Williams v. Rhodes and Public Financing of Political Parties Under
the American and German Constitutions, 1969 Sur. Cr. REv. 271, 278-79 n.31; text

and notes at notes 64-67 infra.
22 In addition to the judicial decisions discussed below, Congress enacted the Voting
Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1973 -73p (1970) and the 1970 Amendments to
the voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1970). In addition, the twenty-third, twentyfourth, and twenty-sixth amendments to the Constitution had the effect of removing restrictions on the franchise.
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equal protection test, finding unconstitutional many restrictions on the
right to vote that previously would have withstood constitutional challenge. 23 The new equal protection consists of a two-tier approach. When
the right asserted is classified as fundamental-voting, 24 freedom from
incarceration, 25 interstate travel, 26 and speech 2 -- or when the classification scheme is based on a suspect criterion, most notably race, 28 the
Court will sustain the legislation only when the legislative ends are
compelling and the statute is narrowly drawn to cause minimal interference with the protected right. If, on the other hand, the right being
urged is not "fundamental" and the classification not suspect, great
deferrence to the legislative judgment is mandated. It is sufficient that
the classification scheme is rational and reasonably related to a legiti29
mate state objective.
The elevation of the right to vote to a fundamental right subject to
the greater scrutiny of the new equal protection is a recent development. It was traditionally thought that the federal Constitution en30
trusted to the states the authority to determine voter qualifications.
Although the "white primary cases" clearly indicated that the states
could not give the franchise to some citizens and deny it to others on
the basis of race, when the classification was not based on race the Court
was willing to uphold the franchise restriction if it was reasonably
related to a legitimate state interest. Thus, as recently as 1959, the Court
upheld a statute conditioning the franchise on passing a literacy test,
explicitly noting that the scheme was "neutral" with regard to race.3 1
The early 1960's marked a turn from the Court's previous view and
the beginning of the "voting rights revolution." In Baker v. Car 3 2 and
Reynolds v. Sims, 33 while not denying that, in theory, the states could
23 See, e.g., G. GUNTHER & N. DOWLING, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
983-89 (8th ed. 1970); Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 HARV. L. REv.
1065 (1969).
24 See text and notes at notes 32-47 infra.
25 E.g., Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
26 E.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
27 E.g., Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
28 See, e.g., Bollng v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S.
214, 216 (1944). There is some indication that wealth classifications are suspect, even
though no case has actually invalidated a law because of its unequal impact on rich and
poor. Harper v. Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 666-69 (1966); cf. McDonald v. Board of
Election Comm'rs, 394 U.S. 802, 807 (1969). But see Independent School Distr. v. Rodriguez, 93 S. Ct. 1278, 1288-94 (1973).
29 E.g., McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961).
30 E.g., Pope v. Williams, 193 U.S. 621 (1904).
31 Lassiter v. Northampton County Bd. of Elections, 360 U.S. 45 (1959).
32 369 U.S. 186 (1962).

33 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
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withhold the franchise from all citizens,34 the Court made clear that
when the franchise is granted the state's burden of justification for treating citizens differently is extremely heavy. In Reynolds the Court relied on the celebrated dicta from Yick Wo v. Hopkins,3 5 that the right
to vote is "a fundamental political right, ... preservative of all rights."
In cases following Baker and Reynolds, the Court decided that states
could not withhold the franchise from residents stationed in the state
by the military,3 6 nor deny participation in the election of county
officials to those who lived in a federal enclave within the county 7 The
Court has held unconstitutional state statutes requiring payment of a
poll tax as a prerequisite to voting in state elections 88 a statute restricting the right to vote in school board elections to parents of children
enrolled in the school system and owners and lessees of taxable realty
in the school district 3 9 and property requirements for eligibility
to participate in referenda on bond issues. 40 The Court also
struck down durational residency requirements of one year in the state
and ninety days in the county, 41 and held that a Texas law requiring
excessive filing fees without reasonable alternatives for getting on the
ballot was an unconstitutional restriction on the rights of voters seeking
42
to support such nominees.
The reapportionment decisions43 are clearly a part of the voting
34 The question of the power of the state to withhold the franchise from all citizens
is still, theoretically, open. In Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970), the Court held that
Congress could set qualifications for participation in federal elections, although it was
unclear whether such authority was based on the privileges and immunities clause of
the fifth amendment, the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment, or
article I, section 4, article II, section 1, and the "necessary and proper clause" of article I,
section 8. The Court also held that Congress could not set qualifications for voting in
state and local elections. If a state denied the right to vote to all its citizens, however,
it may raise a serious question under the "guarantee of a Republican form of Government" clause in article IV, section 4.
35 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886).
38 Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89 (1965).
37 Evans v. Cornman, 398 U.S. 419 (1970).
88 Harper v. Board of Elections, 583 U.S. 663 (1966).
89 Kramer v. School Distr. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621 (1969).
40 Phoenix v. Kolodziejski, 399 U.S. 204 (1970); Cipriano v. Houma, 395 U.S. 701 (1969).
But see Associated Enterprises, Inc. v. Watershed Improvement District, 41 U.S.L.W.
4397 (U.S. March 20, 1973); Salyer Land Co. v. Water Storage District, 41 U.S.L.W.
4390 (U.S. March 20, 1973).
41 Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972). But see Marston v. Lewis, 41 U.S.L.W. 3498
(U.S. March 19, 1973).
42 Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134 (1972).
43 E.g., Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U.S. 526 (1969); Wells v. Rockefeller, 894 U.S. 542
(1969); Avery v. Midland County, 390 U.S. 474 (1968); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533
(1964); Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964).
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rights revolution. 44 If the states are prohibited from granting the franchise to some citizens and not to others without a compelling state
interest, then, according to the Court, it is also impermissible to weight
the votes of some citizens more than the votes of others unless a compelling interest for doing so can be demonstrated. On the basis of the
one-man, one-vote doctrine enunciated in Wesberry v. Sanders, 5 the
Court has indicated that very few of the reasons advanced by the states
for unequal apportionment serve to justify deviation from the one-man,
40
one-vote norm.
The Court continued its voting rights revolution in the landmark
decision of Williams v. Rhodes,47 which concerned an Ohio law permitting only nominees of recognized political parties to appear on general
election ballots. Under the Ohio scheme, political parties could participate in primary elections only if they had received at least 10 percent
of the vote in the previous year's gubernatorial election or had obtained
the signatures of at least 15 percent of the electorate on nominating
petitions more than nine months before the general election. In the
primaries, the parties were required to elect central and county committeemen and delegates to a national convention as well as nominees
for office. Candidates for these positions and for nomination could be
placed on the primary ballot for one party only if they had not voted
in the primary of another party in the four preceding years.
The suit was brought by the American Independent Party, a new
party that did not receive the requisite number of signatures until after
the early filing date, and by the Socialist Workers Party, an old party
that was incapable of obtaining a sufficient number of signatures to
qualify. The Court found that, taken together, the restrictions had the
effect of making it nearly impossible for any party other than the
Democratic or Republican parties to qualify for the general election
ballot. Because of this, the Court held that the statutory scheme violated
the right to vote and the right of political association of those who
would support the nominees of other parties.
The Court's decision in Williams was relied upon heavily in the
recent crossover primary cases. In Williams, the interests of the state in
limiting the number of candidates on election ballots and maintaining
a strong two-party system were found insufficiently compelling to justify
44 See generally Auerbach, The Reapportionment Cases: One Person, One Vote-One
Vote, One Value, 1964 Sup. Cr. Rav. 1.

45 376 U.S. 1 (1964).
46 E.g., Wells v. Rockefeller, 394 U.S. 542 (1969); Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U.S. 526

(1969). But see text and notes at notes 54-55 infra.
47 393 U.S. 23 (1968).
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the extensive restrictions on the formation of new parties. Similarly,
the courts in the recent primary cases thought that restrictions on
crossing over between existing parties have the same potential effect
of preventing the nomination of candidates with substantial bipartisan
or nonpartisan support. Hence, the courts concluded that the restrictions abridged the right to vote and to associate and that the abridgment was not justified by any sufficiently compelling state interest.
C.

Limitations on the Voting Rights Revolution
There are, however, recent decisions indicating that certain restrictions on the franchise will be sustained even in the face of the voting
rights revolution. In Whitcomb v. Chavis,48 the Supreme Court rejected a challenge to an Indiana law that provided for multimember
and single member districting in the state legislature. The plaintiffs,
residents of multimember districts, alleged, inter alia, that their votes
for defeated candidates gave them no representation, whereas, had their
districts been constituted as several single member districts, they
would have elected at least one representative. The Court noted that
the Constitution guarantees an equal opportunity to participate in the
electoral process and an equal "chance of winning," but it does not
require an electoral system that maximizes representation of diverse
minorities. 49 The Court found the alleged violation of equal protection
to be nothing more than an unavoidable function of an electoral system
in which one candidate wins and the other loses.
The importance of Williams v. Rhodes0 may have been tempered
by the Court's subsequent decision in Jenness v. Fortson,51 which concerned a Georgia law that limited access of candidates to the general
election ballot. Under the Georgia statute, only nominees of political
parties that had received more than 20 percent of the statewide vote in
the preceding gubernatorial or presidential election and candidates
that gathered signatures of more than 5 percent of the eligible voters
could run in the general election. Although the Court found that
the restrictions denied some voters the opportunity of voting for a
candidate who best represented their views, it upheld the statute:
"There is surely an important state interest in requiring some preliminary showing of a significant modicum of support before printing
the name of a political organization's candidate on the ballot-the
interest, if no other, in avoiding confusion, deception, and even frus48 403 U.S. 124 (1971).
49 Id. at 158-60.
50 393 U.S. 23 (1968).
51 403 U.S. 431 (1971).
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tration of the democratic process at the general election." 52 The Court
distinguished Williams v. Rhodes on the ground that the Ohio scheme
involved more complicated and difficult prerequisites for nomination.
The Supreme Court recently affirmed without opinion a decision of
a three judge federal court sustaining the constitutionality of an Ohio
statute prohibiting any person from seeking the nomination of a
political party if he had participated in the primary of any other political party in the preceding four years. 53 The opinion of the lower court
explicitly held that the maintenance of the integrity of its political
parties and the prevention of raiding were sufficient state interests to
justify the restrictions that Ohio's statute imposed on the franchise and
on the right of political association.
Even in the area of reapportionment the Supreme Court has recently
indicated that it is willing to weigh the interests advanced by the state
against the restrictions that the state had imposed on first and fourteenth amendment rights.
In Abate v. Mundt,54 the Court held that an 11.9 percent deviation
from equality in apportioning a county legislature was permissible
where the deviation resulted from respect for existing town boundaries
and where the county had a century old history of overlapping functions
and dual personnel between county administration and the towns. And
in Mahan v. Howell,55 the Court distinguished between the apportionment of a state legislature and the apportionment of congressional districts. In the latter, the Court said, one-man, one-vote is commanded
by article I, section 2 of the Constitution and no deviation, except those
unavoidable after a good faith effort, is tolerable. But in the apportionment of a bicameral state legislature there is more room for flexibility.
In Mahan the Court held that because a percentage variation of 16
percent from the ideal district in Virginia's House of Delegates resulted
from a rational state policy respecting boundaries of political subdivisions, the deviation was constitutionally tolerable.
These cases demonstrate that not every restriction on the franchise
will be struck down in the name of equal protection. While restrictions
that interfere with the right to vote and with the right of political association will be carefully scrutinized, the Supreme Court has recognized that there are compelling state interests in regulating the franchise and limiting the access of candidates to the ballot.5 6 The cases
52 Id. at 442.
53 Lippitt v. Cipollone, 404 U.S. 1032 (1972), aff'g 337 F. Supp. 1405 (N.D. Ohio 1971).

54 403 U.S. 182 (1971).
55 93 S. Ct. 979 (1973).
56 A leading commentator has suggested that the Supreme Court is changing the
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suggest that the lower courts, in finding the crossover restrictions unconstitutional, failed to give sufficient weight to the interests advanced by
the states.
D.

Nonintervention in Political Party Operations

The argument that primary elections may warrant judicial treatment
different from that accorded general elections is strengthened by the
doctrine of nonintervention in the internal operation of political parties. 57 Although political parties are no longer considered purely private
associations whose actions fail to constitute state action, nevertheless
they are not considered agents of the state in all respects. It has been
58
suggested that much of the nonintervention doctrine had been eroded,
but the recent Supreme Court decision in the companion cases of
O'Brien v. Brown5" and Keane v. National DemocraticParty ° demonstrate that the nonintervention doctrine may still have some life. Both
O'Brien and Keane concerned challenges to the report of the Credentials Committee of the 1972 Democratic National Convention. Keane
involved a challenge to the committee's recommendation not to seat the
Illinois delegation elected in the state presidential primary in violation
of the "slate making" guidelines adopted by the Democratic Party in the
call to the convention. O'Brien involved a challenge to the recommendation to unseat 151 of 271 delegates from California, committed by
California law to George McGovern as a result of his victory in the
state's "winner-take-all" primary. The committee found the winnertake-all primary to be contrary to the mandate of the 1968 Democratic
Convention calling for reform, even though the California rule was
not explicitly prohibited by the guidelines implementing those reforms. 1
"equal protection test" by collapsing the two tiers into one, asking whether there is
"an appropriate governmental interest suitably furthered by the differential treatment."
Chicago Police Department v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972). In Bullock v. Carter, 405
U.S. 134 (1972), the court found the candidate filing fees unconstitutional without speaking
in terms of a "compelling interest" and in Rosario v. Rockefeller, 93 Sup. Ct. 1245 (1973)
and Marston v. Lewis, 93 Sup. Ct. 1211 (1973), the Court upheld registration requirements
without deciding whether the state interest was compelling. Gunther, The Supreme
Court, 1971 Term-Foreword:In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A
Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. Rnv. 1, 17-18 (1972).
57 See generally Mitau, Judicial Determination of Political Party Organizational Autonomy, 42 MINN. L. RV. 245 (1957).
58 See Note, Judicial Intervention in the Presidential Candidate Selection Process: One
Step Backwards, 47 N.Y.U.L. R~v. 1185, 1186-1202 (1972).
59 409 U.S. 1 (1972).
60 Id.
61 See MANDATE

FOR REFORM: A REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON PARTY STRUCTURE AND

DELEGATE SELECTION TO THE DmoCRATIC

NATIONAL CoMIrTrr

(1970).
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The cases came to the Court three days prior to the opening session
of the Convention. Citing the pressures of time and finding that the
actions of the committee were only recommendations that the Convention might accept or reject, the Court refused to grant writs of certiorari
and stayed the judgment of the court of appeals, allowing the Convention to pass upon the recommendations of the Committee. Thus,
the possibility of the Convention giving the litigants the relief they
sought in court was not foreclosed. The Court acknowledged, however,
that the stays "may well preclude any judicial review of the final action
of the Democratic National Convention on the recommendation of
its Credentials Committee." 62 In granting the stays, the Court considered
the probability that the court of appeals erred in holding that the
merits of these controversies were appropriate for decision by the
federal courts. The majority opinion expressed "grave doubts" about
the action of the court of appeals, stating:
No case is cited to us in which any federal court has undertaken
to interject itself into the deliberative processes of a national political convention; no holding of this court up to now gives support
for judicial intervention in the circumstances presented here,
involving as they do, relationships of great delicacy that are essentially political in nature [citation omitted]. Judicial intervention in this area traditionally has been approached with great
caution and restraint [citation omitted]. It has been understood
since our national political parties first came into being as voluntary associations of individuals that the convention itself is the
proper forum for determining
intra-party disputes as to which
3
delegates shall be seated.1

O'Brien is in a tradition of judicial reluctance to interfere in the
convention process. 64 Courts have generally refused to apply the oneman, one-vote doctrine to party conventions. 5 Thus, in Irish v.
62 409 U.S. at 5.
63 Id. at 4. Justice Marshall, joined by Justice Douglas, issued a vigorous dissent, arguing
that the crux of the case was the right to vote and to have one's votes counted in presidential primary elections. Justice Marshall contended that a determination by the convention aainst the litigants would not be mooted by the termination of the convention
and a postconvention determination of the merits would be "a far more serious intrusion
into the democratic process" than a current determination of the merits. Id. at 10.
64 See generally Note, Freedom of Association and the Selection of Delegates to National
Political Conventions, 56 CORNELL L RFv. 148 (1970); Comment, One Man, One Vote
and Selection of Delegates to National Nominating Conventions, 37 U. Cm. L. Rxv. 536
(1970); Note, Constitutional Safeguards in the Selection of Delegates to PresidentialNominating Conventions, 78 YALE L.J. 1228 (1969).
65 E.g., Bode v. National Democratic Comm., 452 F.2d 1302 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Georgia
v. National Democratic Party, 447 F.2d 1271 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 858 (1971);
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Democratic-Farmer-LaborParty,66 the Court specifically noted that
because no allegation of racial discrimination was involved, the case
was distinguishable from the "white primary cases," and that, as a
general matter, judicial intervention in the political process is inappropriate. 7 In Lynch v. Torquato68 and in Dahl v. Republican
State Committee 9 lower courts held that elections of Democratic county
chairmen and Republican state committeemen were not subject to
one-man, one-vote requirements because the elections were inside the
realm of political party operations. ° In Ray v. Blair,71 cited with
approval in O'Brien v. Brown,72 the Supreme Court sustained the constitutionality of a regulation of the Democratic Party of Alabama that
required all candidates in a statewide primary for Presidential Elector,
whether or not successful, to take an oath pledging their support for
the eventual Democratic presidential nominee. These cases indicate
that the courts are more likely to restrain themselves from interfering
in the operations of conventions, than from interfering in the regulation of primaries, even though the functions of conventions and primaries in the electoral process are similar. It is apparent, however, that
the courts recognize a legitimate interest in maintaining the autonomy of the political parties.
This reluctance to interfere in the operations of political parties may
be based on the right of political association. Threats to the right of
association usually are found to stem from state actions impairing a
group's attempts to organize to pursue a form of expression protected
by the first amendment.7 3 For example, in Williams v. Rhodes74 the
Court found that the burden placed by the state on attempts to organize
Irish v. Democrat-Farmer Labor Party, 399 F.2d 119 (8th Cir. 1968). Contra, Maxey v. State
Democratic Comm., 319 F. Supp. 673 (W.D. Wash. 1970).
66 399 F.2d 119 (8th Cir. 1968).
67 In Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368 (1963), the Court declared unconstitutional, as a
violation of the one-man, one-vote doctrine, the Georgia system of county-unit voting
as it was applied in the Democratic senatorial primary. The state, however, did not
attempt to justify the use of the system by citing to any unique interest involved in a
primary and the Court, after finding state action, was free to treat the case as if it had
arisen in a general election context.
68 343 F.2d 370 (3d Cir. 1965).
69 319 F. Supp. 682 (W.D. Wash.), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 393 U.S.
408 (1970).
70 See also Seergy v. Republican County Comm., 459 F.2d 308 (2d Cir. 1972), in
which the court permitted the Republican county central committee to use a voting system
for all purposes, except candidate selection, that violated one-man, one-vote.
71 343 U.S. 214 (1952).
72 409 U.S. at 4.
73 E.g., NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
74 393 U.S. 23 (1968).
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a new political party abridged the right of association. A degree of
autonomy for political parties may be justified as an extension of the
same reasoning. The organization of an effective political party may be
impaired as much by not allowing the party to control its own membership and operation as by the state restricting its membership. A
party of radicals that cannot limit its membership to those of like
persuasion would immediately cease to be an effective voice for radical
change.7 5 This does not mean that political parties must be immune
from legislative and judicial regulation. It does indicate, however, that
the impact on the autonomy of the political party is a factor that must
be considered in deciding the constitutionality of statutes relating to
political parties.
In the crossover primary cases, the courts found the more severe
"lock in" restrictions on crossovers unconstitutional, relying heavily on
the voting rights revolution. But the courts seemed unaware that in
the absence of racial classification there may be less justification for
treating primaries and general elections as if they were the same. For
primaries, while part of the electoral process, are also as much a part
of political party operations as conventions. By interfering with the
parties' internal operations the courts are restricting the parties' autonomy and may be impairing their ability to perform effectively the
functions demanded of them in the political system.
II.

EFFECTS OF THE CROSSOVER PRIMARY

In determining the effect of the crossover cases, the crucial question
is the impact upon the party system of varying the mode of selection of
party nominees. It is possible to place the ways in which a party can
select its nominees into seven categories."
1. Multiple Vote Primary. Under this system the potential voter is
given the ballots of all parties and is permitted to vote for a nominee
from each party for each office. While no state currently sanctions
this type of primary, it is the ultimate extension of the doctrine that the
right to participate in the nominating process is a corollary of the
right to vote.
2. Blanket Primary. Under this system, used only in Washington
and Alaska, the voter is permitted to participate in one primary for
each office, but can alternate among the various parties. In other words,
75 See text at note 100 infra.

76 For a table stating the type of nominating mechanism in effect in each state for
statewide offices, see COUNCM OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, 19 THE BOOK OF THE STATES,
1972-73 at 29 [hereinafter cited as BooK OF THE STATES].
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the voter can, at the same election, participate in the Democratic
77
primary for governor and the Republican primary for senator.
3. Open Primary. Under this scheme the voter is given the ballots
of all parties, but is permitted to mark the ballot of only one. Seven
states employ this method of nomination for candidates for statewide
78
office.
4. Closed Primary Based on Oath of Affiliation. The closed primary, in a variety of forms, is the mode of party nomination in forty
states. It is based on the theory that party nominating procedures
should be limited to party members. The definition of party membership varies and, as a result, it is necessary to differentiate between two
types of closed primaries. The less restrictive type merely requires the
potential voter to take an oath attesting to his past support or present
intention to support the party's nominees as a condition of participation
79
in the party primary.
5. Restrictive Closed Primary. This form of the closed primary
imposes a more restrictive definition of party membership and requires
that a voter seeking to participate in a primary not have voted in the
primary of another political party for a specified period of time. A
variation on this form requires a voter to register in the party in whose
primary he seeks to vote at a given time prior to the primary. It is, of
course, these restrictions that are being attacked in the crossover primary cases.8 0
6. Convention. The convention system is the most common means
of nominating candidates without using primaries. States vary considerably on the process for selecting delegates to the convention, but all
limit participation in that selection process to party members, variously
81
defined.
7. Slatemaking. Under this system, the party nominees are selected
77 In Green v. Texas, 351 F. Supp. 143 (N.D. Tex. 1972), a voter brought a suit
alleging that a blanket primary was required by the Constitution once a state had instituted a primary. The court did not sustain the challenge.
78 Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, North Dakota, Utah, Vermont, and Wisconsin. Book
oF THE STATES, supra note 76, at 29.
79 The same court that found the twenty-three month Illinois restriction unconstitutional upheld the statement of affiliation requirement. Pontikes v. Kusper, 345 F. Supp.

1104, 1109-10 (N.D. IIl. 1972), prob. juris. noted, 41 U.S.L.W. 3524 (U.S. Apr. 2, 1973). On
the types of oaths required, see A. RANNEY & W. KENDALL, DIEtocRAY AND THE AMEmCAN
PARTY SysTEm 206 (1956).

See text and notes at notes 2-3 supra.
81 Only one state, Indiana, uses the convention system exclusively for nominations
for statewide offices. However, fifteen states use a combination of primaries and conventions to select party nominees. BOOK OF THE STATES, supra note 76, at 29.
80
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in caucus, the participants in the caucus usually having been selected on
the basis of their position in the party hierarchy.
The seven basic nominating patterns can be looked at as a continuum
of alternatives arranged in order of the quantum of voter participation
permitted in each. But it may be an oversimplification to assume that
the greater the degree of voter participation in the nominating process,
the more democratic the electoral process, as a whole, will become.
It may be helpful to analyze the ways in which these alternative
nominating processes would produce differing results in operation.
There are two basic reasons why voters who usually support the nominees of one party would desire to participate in the primary of another
party-first, to effectuate the nomination of the candidate who could
be defeated most easily by the nominee of the voter's own party, and
second, to effectuate the nomination of a candidate whom the voter prefers to the nominee of his own party. Only the voter crossing over
with the first intention is generally defined as a "raider. ' 82 In the
crossover primary cases, the courts acknowledged a legitimate state
interest in preventing raiding. The effect of raiding can be demonstrated with the use of a hypothetical.
Assume a constituency with 200,000 Democrats, 100,000 Republicans,
and a Republican candidate uncontested in a primary. The Democratic
primary has three contestants, A, B, and C. A and B each have the
support of about 40 percent of the Democratic voters; C has the support
of the remaining 20 percent. Assume further that, if A or B is the
Democratic nominee, he will have the support of his own backers,
all the backers of the other, and half of C's backers. Hence, if either
A or B is nominated, he will be supported by 90 percent of the
Democrats and will win the general election.
Under the slatemaking, convention, or closed primary systems, that
would, in all likelihood, be the result. C can be nominated only if
Republicans are allowed to participate in the Democratic primary. If
the Republican voters entered the Democratic primary for the purpose
of raiding, then they would support the Republican nominee in the
general election and C might not get sufficient support from the
supporters of A and B to win the general election. The differences
between the multiple vote, the blanket, and the open primary is the
degree to which raiding is facilitated. In the open primary the Republican voters would be willing to cross over to nominate C only if
there is no primary on the Republican side in which they would like to
82 See Rosario v. Rockefeller, 458 F.2d 649, 652 (2d Cir. 1972), afJ'd, 93 S. Ct. 1245 (1973).
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participate. In the blanket primary, the cost of crossing over is less,
since the Republican voter is not forced to forego the opportunity of
participating in any contest on the Republican side except the primary
for the same office. In the multiple vote primary there is no cost in
crossing over, since, even if a Republican candidate for the office was
faced with a primary challenge, the Republican voter could exercise
his vote in the Republican contest and still cross over to vote for C in
the Democratic primary. The closed primary based on the oath of
affiliation differs from the open primary in reducing raiding only to the
extent that the voter takes the oath seriously, since, as a practical matter,
the oath cannot be challenged. It is well established that numerous restrictions in the definition of party membership were instituted in re83
sponse to raiding in supposedly closed primaries.
It seems clear that widespread raiding would seriously diminish the
usefulness of the primary as a decision making process; if raiding were
widespread, the political parties would do everything possible to avoid
primary contests. In the hypothetical above, A and B would avoid competing in the primary at all costs and if C preferred A or B to the
Republican nominee, he too would participate in a compromise to
avoid the primary. When the probability of raiding is great, as in the
multiple vote and blanket primaries, the probability of the stronger
party nominating its strongest candidate and the weaker party having
its weakest candidate nominated by raiders becomes a real threat. The
result may be that the primary of the stronger party becomes the most
crucial phase of the election process. 84
The argument for permitting crossovers is based upon the alternative
83 The restrictions in New Jersey and Illinois, which were successfully challenged in
Nagler v. Stiles, 343 F. Supp. 415 (D.N.J. 1972), and Pontikes v. Kusper, 345 F. Supp.
1104 (N.D. Ill. 1972), prob. juris. noted, 41 U.S.L.W. 3524 (U.S. Apr. 2, 1973) respectively,
were enacted after several urban political bosses managed to control not only the
nominations of their own parties, but those of the opposing parties as well, by convincing
enough of their Democratic partisans to vote in the closed Republican primaries. Lest
one be tempted to dismiss the practice to those states with a reputation for political
chicanery, in Colorado in 1930 and in South Dakota in 1922 Democrats participated in
the Republican primary for the purpose of nominating the weakest Republican candidate. In Minnesota in 1938, the Republicans entered the Farmer-Labor Party primary
to bring about the defeat in the primary of the incumbent governor. Berdahl, Party
Membership in the United States, 36 Am. POL. Sci. REv. 16, 41-50 (1942). See also A.
RANNEY & W. KENDALL, supra note 79, at 209-11.
84 The turnout in primary elections is generally substantially lower than in general
elections, even in those cases in which the primary is known to be more important than
the general election. In the solidly Democratic South from 1928-1948, when victory
in the Democratic primary was tantamount to election, the turnout was 10 percent
higher in the general election. C. EWING, PRIMARY ELECTIONS IN THE SouTH: A STUDY IN
UNiPARTY PoLITrcs 104-05 (1953).
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supposition that the motive for crossing over is not to nominate the
weakest candidate, but to support a candidate that the voter prefers to
any other candidate, including those of his own party.8 5 Given that assumption, in the hypothetical discussed above, those Republicans who
would vote for C in the Democratic primary would support him in the
general election as well and would support the Republican candidate
only if A or B was the Democratic nominee. Assuming that C, under
these conditions, is the first choice of 50 percent of the Republicans and
retains the support of 20 percent of the Democrats, he would win a
Democratic primary that permitted crossovers as long as both A and B
remained candidates. C's victory in the primary would result in a general election between the third and fourth choices of a majority of the
voters. If it is assumed that A would prefer B to C and B would prefer
A to C, there exists an incentive for them to compromise so as to avoid
a primary contest between themselves.
Those supporting the crossover primary in some form would counter
with an alternative hypothetical: a Democratic primary between A and
B-A having the support of 60 percent of the Democrats and B having
the support of 40 percent. The Republican nominee, who is not being
contested for nomination, is supported by 60 percent of the Republicans, while the other 40 percent support B. Assuming that there are
an equal number of Democrats and Republicans, under a primary
system permitting crossovers, B would emerge as the Democratic
nominee and subsequently win the general election. But under a
primary system prohibiting crossovers, the general election would be
between A and the Republican nominee, while B, the candidate with
the greatest support, would not even be nominated. To the argument
that B could always run as an independent in the general election, it
might be responded that, without the Democratic nomination, B could
not win, since those Democratic voters who favored him in the primary
would prefer to support the nominee of the party to B's independent
candidacy. This, however, may well be the strongest argument against
allowing the crossover primary. For if those voters who favored B in
the primary support A in the three-way general election, it is an indication that remaining a part of the basic coalition of the Democratic
Party is more important to them than the election of B. It is, in essence,
a demonstration that the primary is an intracoalitional event. Party
members are attempting to resolve differences within their coalition
while intending to remain as a single coalition in the general election.
The obvious result is that the party will be forced to resolve its intra85 See Rosario v. Rockefeller, 93 S. Ct. 1245, 1255-56 (1973) (dissenting opinion).

The University of Chicago Law Review

[40:636

coalitional disputes in some manner before the primary if the primary,
because crossovers are allowed, ceases to be an intracoalitional event.
Thus, as in the situation described above, A and B will compromise in
advance to avoid a primary fight, since the primary will have become a
contest between coalitions and it is imperative to have the coalition
united prior to the primary in order to win. In a sense, the primary
will merely have replaced the general election and a convention or a
preprimary of some sort will of necessity replace the primary.
These hypotheticals suggest that in the crossover primary cases the
courts may have lost sight of a crucial fact-that the most important
function of political parties in the American political system is to
aggregate interests and to create coalitions. A political party is, by
definition, a group that seeks power. The traditional distinction between a party and an interest group is that the former seeks to govern,
while the latter seeks to advance interests and to influence policies.8 6
An interest group is successful when a bill that it has promoted is
enacted or when its influence causes the nomination of candidates receptive to its policies. A party is successful only when it gains the reins
of government. In American politics the vehicle for attaining power is
the election process. Hence, the political parties are the contestants of
elections. In order to be successful the parties must create coalitions,
and the recruitment of candidates and the mobilization of voters are
87
parts of the process of coalition buildingIn a society in which voters are concerned with only a single issue,
presenting only two possible solutions, the existence of political parties
would be superfluous. An election would be a contest between those
who favored one resolution of the issue and those who favored the
only alternative, and the side with the most adherents would win. At
all subsequent elections the same side would win unless enough voters
changed their minds to alter the power balance. In a pluralistic society,
however, the need for a coalition maker becomes apparent. Where one
voter favors abortion, federal aid to education, and increased defense
spending, while another favors gun control, farm subsidies, and legalization of marijuana, the role of political parties increases in importance.
In the absence of parties, each interest group would put forward its own
candidate whose single major concern would be the policy advocated by
the interest group. Each voter would be forced to decide which of the
many issues concerning him is most important and align himself with
the nominee of the interest group supporting his position on that issue.
86 See, e.g., V.0.

KEY POLITICS, PARTIES, AND PRESSURE GROUPS 16-65

(5th ed. 1964).

87 E.g., F. SoRAuF, POLITICAL PARTIES IN THE MIERICAN SYSTEMa 2-6 (1964).
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The election would result in a wide fragmentation of the vote and in
the success of an interest group limited in scope and purpose to a single
issue. s8 The role of the political party is to mold a plurality of interests
into a more durable coalition. The party could take all voters favoring
abortion and ambivalent on gun control and all those favoring gun
control and ambivalent on abortion and nominate a candidate favoring gun control and abortion. If the same candidate opposes defense
spending, all those who oppose defense spending and are ambivalent as
to the other two issues will join the coalition.
It is obvious that when the voters are concerned with more than a
single issue potential conflicts arise. A voter who opposes defense spending but favors abortion would be undecided whether or not to join the
coalition. But by giving to each member of the coalition something
that he considers important, while requiring a concession on issues of
lesser importance, the party can retain the voter in its coalition. The
more things that a party is able to deliver to various members of its
coalition-legislation, patronage jobs, social welfare, ethnic recognition
in candidate selection-the more successful the party can be in perpetuating its coalition and remaining in power. Since the goal of the
party is to gain and retain control of the government, it does not look to
the quick fulfillment of a policy objective at the expense of its governing coalition. Thus a party will not adopt an antiabortion bill if the
result would be to destroy its coalition irreparably. A "Right to Life
Group" would not hesitate to do so even if it meant its certain defeat at
the polls; the passage of the bill would fulfill its goal and attaining
power is merely a step toward that end.
The long term concerns of the party result in increasing both
societal stability and governmental stability. The inherent conflicts are
minimized by the party in order to avoid fragmentation of the coalitions. The success of the parties in maintaining their coalitions limits
the number of groups competing at the electoral level.8 9 Since it is
easier to enlarge the coalition by adding groups on the border between
the parties rather than restructuring the coalitions entirely, parties
tend to compete for similar groups, thereby minimizing differences on
issues of great potential divisiveness. The desire to perpetuate the
88 In THE FEDERALISt No. 10, Madison expressed the view that a "faction" taking
control of the government endangers liberty. He argued that this could be avoided by
creating a system with a sufficient plurality of interests to check the concentration of

power in a single faction. A leading commentator contends that the political party serves
as the antidote to factionalism by subordinating the demands of each pressure group

to the success of the party. E.E.

SCHATrSCHNEIDER, PARTY GOVERNMENT

6-16 (1942).

89 See, e.g., E. Banfield, In Defense of the American Party System, in POLrcAL
U.S.A. 21-39 (R. Goldwin ed. 1964).
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existing coalition forces the party to try to meet the expectations of its
members, creating a sense of party responsibility. The result is generally to allow voters to predict what a party will do in office better
than they can predict what actions an individual elected by a more
temporary alliance will take. 90
To the extent that the interests of the coalition reflect consistent
policy positions, competing parties develop political ideologies. If a
party has advocated federal aid to education, it is likely that advocating
federal health insurance will cause less resistance among the members of
its coalition than taking the opposite position. It is likely, therefore, that
maintaining an ideologically consistent policy will add more members
to the coalition with fewer defections. In fact, there is little doubt that
voters do associate the parties with distinct policy positions and that on
issues of substantial importance those perceptions are reflected by the
voters.9 1 Elections are often decided by those voters not a part of the
coalition of any party or those members of the coalition whose connection is sufficiently tenuous to cause them to defect as a result of the
party taking positions of which they do not approve.
As part of the functions of creating the coalitions, the parties perform auxiliary functions of great value to the political system. As the
instrument of candidate recruitment and voter mobilization, political
parties finance campaigns and play crucial roles in political education
and socialization. 92 The parties operate alongside the mass media in
organizing knowledge about American politics. The conflicting claims
of the parties inform the voters concerning issues of importance, and
simplify a complexity of arguments so as to make the competing positions comprehensible to the less sophisticated voter. The parties articulate interests and relate a set of values to a policy or candidate alternative faced by the voter. Moreover, the parties can play an important
90 There is a substantial amount of opinion that parties should be more centralized
and exert stricter discipline over its elected candidates. This would result in elected
officials taking action more closely related to that advocated in their campaigns and in
more ideologically oriented parties. See, e.g., Committee on Political Parties of the
American Political Science Ass'n, Toward A More Responsible Two Party System, 44 Am.
POL. Sci. REV. (Supplement to Sept. issue, 1950). It has been argued, however, that this
would adversely affect the ability of the parties to create coalitions and to reconcile
conflicting interests. See, e.g., E. BANFmLD, supra note 89; Kirkpatrick, Toward a More
Responsible Two-Party System: Political Science, Policy Science or Pseudo-Science?, 65 Ar.
POL. Sa. REv. 965 (1971); Turner, Responsible Parties:A Dissent from the Floor, 45 Ar.
POL. Sa. Rv. 143 (1951).
91 See, e.g., Pomper, From Confusion to Clarity: Issues and American Voters 1956-68,
66 Am. PoL. Sa. REv. 415 (1972); RePass, Issue Salience and Party Choice, 65 Am. POL.
Sa. REv. 389 (1971). ,But see A. CAmPBELL, P. CONvERSE, W. MILLER, & D. SToKEs, TIM
AMERICAN VOTER (1960). For a nearly comprehensive listing of recent studies on this question, see Kessel, Comment: The Issues in Issue Voting, 66 Am.POL. Sa. REv. 459 n.1 (1972).
92 See generally F. SoRAuF, supra note 87.
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role in integrating divergent and alienated groups into the political
93
and social system.
If judicial decisions were to prevent the political party from taking
steps to select its nominees prior to primary elections, rather than
simply organizing conventions or preprimaries, the result would be a
fragmentation of the coalition. The party would cease to function if
victory in the primary would no longer include an automatic claim to
the support of the preexisting coalition, since, if the party cannot select
or control its nominees, then it cannot deliver on the promises made to
the members of the coalition, and the party would lose its means of
creating and maintaining its coalition. As a result, candidates representing the interest groups would have to create their own coalitions, which
would be more ad hoc and temporary in nature. 94 The parties would, to
some degree, be incapable of performing those functions generally attributed to them. Instead, those functions would have to be performed
by other groups, more temporary and often less capable of doing so.
The recruitment and mobilization functions would be undertaken by
ad hoc groups concerned with a single candidate or single issue. The
candidates would be likely to have an independent basis of support
and would have to have large amounts of private money at their disposal to be successful. The aggregation and coalescing of interests would
be done on a less permanent basis and probably at the governmental
level itself with a consequent increase in instability. Furthermore,
it seems likely that many of the functions political parties perform
between elections would, of necessity, be taken over by other institutions, most probably the government, much in the same way that
the decline of the urban political machines thrust much of the task of
public welfare on the government bureaucracy. 95
Given this perspective on the American party system, a reexamination of the crossover primary decisions is in order. In holding that the
state legislatures may not hold restrictive closed primaries, the courts
93 The role played by the urban political machines in providing access into the political
and socioeconomic systems for the immigrant groups in the first quarter of the twentieth
century is an important contribution of the parties. E. BANFIELD & J. WILSON, CITY POLITICS 38-4 (1963).
94 One commentator has suggested that the coalitions that would arise would closely

resemble those that the parties create, since the candidates would seek to maximize
votes much as the parties do. A. DowNs, AN EcONOMIC THEORy OF DEMoCRACY (1957).
That argument, however, assumes a linear spectrum of interest (like a liberal-conservative
axis), in which only a very limited number of coalitions are feasible. It seems likely that
the fragmentation of interests is, in fact, much greater and only through the long term
operation of a party and the large number of potential benefits available to a party
for distribution to coalition members can a more permanent coalition be established. See
E.E. ScHATrsCHNFmER, supra note 88, at 28-34.
95 E.

BANFIELD

& J. WILSON, supra note 93, at 330-46.
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may well have failed to understand the true nature of a primary as an
intracoalitional event and may be forcing the party to make its nominations in a preprimary convention. If the courts successfully open the
nominating process to all voters without regard to party affiliation the
price may well be the decline of strong competitive parties.
96
In this light, the Supreme Court's decision in Williams v. Rhodes
can be viewed as an underpinning for judicial decisions finding crossover restrictions permissible rather than as a basis for invalidating
them.97 In Williams, the Court expanded access to the ballot in general
elections, recognizing that parties create coalitions offering policy alternatives. The decision serves to facilitate the formation of new parties
to contest the elections. But it does not shift the focus of the general
political struggle to the primary. Instead, it leaves the primary as an
intrapartisan event in which the respective coalitions of the party can
work out the proper conciliations of their own interests and then face
the electorate offering a coherent policy alternative. In fact, to the extent that the decision increases the policy alternatives competing in the
general election, it makes interference in primary operations unnecessary. Williams can be read as establishing a constitutional right for a
substantial group of voters-a "significant modicum," in the Jenness
v. Fortson9s terminology-to raise an issue crucial to them in a serious
way among the electorate.
Primaries, however, have tended to be an improper forum for raising
such issues in the American political system.99 Williams not only permits the parties to continue to perform their functions of coalition
and aggregation, but encourages each party to perform those functions
more effectively, by sufficiently conciliating the interests advanced by
the challengers with its own in order to avoid electoral competition.
Justice Black, in Williams, found the constitutional infirmity to be the
advantage given to the current Democratic and Republican nominees
over those of other parties, not the preferred position given to party
nominees over potential independent candidates. 00 Thus, the right
guaranteed by Williams is the right of a new party to emerge when the
old ones fail in their performance or when the grievance of the group
is so fundamental as to be irreconcilable with the existing parties.
If the existing parties fail to bring emerging parties into their coalitions, the result under Williams is a multiplicity of parties competing in
96 393 U.S. 25 (1968).
97 But see Barton, The GeneralElection Ballot: More Nominees or More Representative
Nominees?, 22 STAN. L. REV. 165 (1970).
98 403 U.S. 431 (1971).
99 See note 84 supra.
100 393 U.S. at 32.
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the general election. In the absence of a runoff election, the possibility
of a minority candidate being successful is significant, and the incentive
for the proliferation of parties is increased. Hence, the increased ballot
access enhances the likelihood of coalition fragmentation. Given this
prospect, it becomes imperative that political parties that are capable of
retaining the elements of their coalitions not be hampered in their
efforts to do so. The reduction of control in candidate selection and
interest conciliation that results from the relaxing of crossover restrictions becomes an even more critical danger in this context.
Even for the newly emerging parties the restrictions on crossovers
may be extremely crucial. If party Y is created hy a dissident group
formerly belonging to party X, allowing members of party X to cross
over and select the nominees of party Y may serve to kill the emerging
party. The ability to select its own candidates and to form its own coalition by appealing to a variety of interests may be an absolute prerequisite to the emergence of the new group as a viable political party.
The ideal situation may be to give to each party the power to determine eligibility to participate in its own primary. While crossover
voting restrictions protect the strength and autonomy of political
parties, they may be accompanied by offsetting disadvantages. A party
may find that, although allowing crossovers would increase the danger
that the party would lose control of its candidate recruitment process,
this danger is outweighed by the gains in voter recruitment, recognition
of potential additions to its coalition, and increased enthusiasm among
its supporters that might result from allowing broader participation in
its nominating procedures. There seems to be no reason why each
party should not be allowed to make its own calculus regarding the
impact of crossovers, and to determine the optimum way in which to
perform its functions with respect to its ultimate goal of vote maximization. The right of political association should require these decisions to be made by each party. The government is prohibited from
impairing the organization of a group seeking to nominate a candidate.
Requiring a group to open its doors to all comers dilutes the effectiveness of the group and serves the same result as prohibiting their
organization in the first place. If the result of crossovers is that John
Connally is the nominee of the Raza Unida Party or James Eastland of
the Mississippi Freedom Democrats, the party is no better off than it
would have been had the state expressly prohibited its organization.
CONCLUSION

Whether the rules regarding eligibility are established by the state or
by the parties, there are some restrictions on primary participation
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that should not be allowed to stand. It may be contended that all restrictions on primary participation should be sustained, on the ground
that if parties attempt to maximize votes they will not arbitrarily discriminate against any group. If one party did so discriminate, another
would appeal to that same group trying to add it to its coalition. But the
experience of the post-Reconstruction South indicates that parties may
attempt to exclude a group from political participation even at the
price of electoral success; indeed, there may also be situations in which
party discrimination against certain groups serves as a tactic of vote
maximization. While a party cannot be forced by legislation to try to
bring a specific group into its coalition, it is reasonable to prohibit
discrimination by a party with respect to eligibility to participate in
its nominating process. Such discrimination is, however, very different
from crossover limitations, since it is unrelated to the prevention of
raiding and party strength and is more clearly invidious in nature. It is
a perfectly tenable constitutional position to permit the states or the
political parties themselves to protect party integrity by placing time
restrictions on crossovers, provided the restrictions are neutral in nature
and application, and, at the same time, to prohibit any other restriction
on primary participation, finding no sufficient state interest to justify it.
Glen S. Lewy

